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Abstract 
I articulate an African view of personhood that combines 
beauty and goodness–aesthetic and moral features. I discuss 
the idea of communalism, which provides the social and moral 
values and belief system that give meaning to this view of 
personhood. I use ideas from some African ethnic traditions, 
or some people’s account of these traditions, as examples to 
illustrate this view. The similarities in these examples from 
different ethnic traditions indicate that it is reasonable to 
characterize this view as a common theme that may plausibly 
represent many African cultures. This essay does not seek to 
provide an anthropological descriptive view, but a plausible 
philosophical stance on how we ought to understand the idea 
of personhood in African cultures. I do not suggest that all 
African cultures or traditions have exactly the same view or 
that they hold this view in the same way, extent or degree. 
Obviously, there may be minor differences that do not alter the 
essence of the view. 
 
Many of the authors quoted in this paper who have written on 
African philosophy use the phrase, ‘African culture’, ‘African 
tradition’, ‘African view’ or ‘African society’. Thus, it has 
become commonplace in African philosophical circles that 
when the prefix ‘African’ is used in the literature on African 
philosophy, it does not imply that Africa is a monolith or that 
its traditions are static. There is a recognition that some 
traditions have changed or are changing. The use of ‘African 
tradition’ usually indicates a generalizing theoretical 
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abstraction about some enduring and dominant similar themes 
or ideas in many African traditions. It is also meant to contrast 
‘African’ with ‘Western’ traditions, and to also respond to 
Western critiques of Africa as a group. It is used in a similar 
way in which the prefix ‘Western’ is used in the literature. 
This notion of ‘Western’, which is replete in the literature, 
does not suggest the West is a monolith, but rather, a reference 
to some similar dominant themes in Western thought.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
articulate an African view of personhood that combines 
beauty and goodness–aesthetic and moral features. I 
discuss the idea of communalism, which provides the 
social and moral values and belief system that give meaning 
to this view of personhood. I use ideas from some African 
ethnic traditions, or some people’s account of these 
traditions, as examples to illustrate this view. The 
similarities in these examples from different ethnic traditions 
indicate that it is reasonable to characterize this view as a 
common theme that may plausibly represent many African 
cultures. This essay does not seek to provide an 
anthropological descriptive view, but a plausible 
philosophical stance on how we ought to understand the idea 
of personhood in African cultures. I do not suggest that all 
African cultures or traditions have exactly the same view or 
that they hold this view in the same way, extent or degree. 
Obviously, there may be minor differences that do not alter 
the essence of the view. 
 
Many of the authors quoted in this paper who have written 
on African philosophy use the phrase, ‘African culture’, 
‘African tradition’, ‘African view’ or ‘African society’. 
Thus, it has become commonplace in African philosophical 
circles that when the prefix ‘African’ is used in the literature 
on African philosophy, it does not imply that Africa is a 
monolith or that its traditions are static. There is a 
recognition that some traditions have changed or are 
changing. The use of ‘African tradition’ usually indicates a 
generalizing theoretical abstraction about some enduring and 
dominant similar themes or ideas in many African traditions. 
It is also meant to contrast ‘African’ with ‘Western’ 
traditions, and to also respond to Western critiques of Africa 
as a group. It is used in a similar way in which the prefix 
‘Western’ is used in the literature. This notion of ‘Western’, 
I 
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which is replete in the literature, does not suggest the West is 
a monolith, but rather, a reference to some similar dominant 
themes in Western thought.  
 
COMMUNALISM AND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 
BEAUTY AND GOODNESS 
 
One feature of communalism, which is a core element of 
African cultural traditions, is its normative (moral and 
aesthetic) conception of personhood. This conception 
implies that one is considered a person in a robust sense, 
only when one consistently acts or behaves in ways that are 
considered morally acceptable. Thus, he is a ‘truly beautiful’ 
person, which is both a moral and an aesthetic judgment, or 
perhaps, an aesthetic judgment with a moral connotation or 
underpinning. It is pertinent to indicate that when other 
objects are evaluated as beautiful, it has a different 
connotation, in that it has no moral implications or 
underpinnings. Usually, the aesthetic judgment about one’s 
beauty or the moral judgment about one’s goodness is 
understood as something that supervenes on certain 
descriptive features or facts about a person, a person’s 
character, actions, or behavior. These features and facts 
define what it means for a human being to be beautiful as 
opposed to other objects. 
 
Barry Hallen illustrates the connection between goodness 
and beauty in African traditions with examples from the 
Yoruba culture. He says: “In ordinary, everyday Yoruba 
discourse the term most frequently mentioned of 
fundamental relevance to aesthetic concern is ewa, which is 
normally translated into English as ‘beauty’. But rather than 
being primarily associated with the arts or crafts, its most 
common usage, as might be expected, is with reference to 
human beings.”i This idea of beauty as applied to humans, 
which involves an aesthetic judgment, is not simply a 
Essays in Philosophy 17(1) 
 
129 
 
judgment about physical beauty based on one’s physical 
features, but a judgment about one’s moral qualities and 
social abilities to behave in acceptable ways in order to meet 
one’s social-moral obligations. Such judgments are based on 
communal values and standards of behavior. Communalism 
indicates that a community may, based on its values, the 
implied obligations, and social recognition, shape an 
individual’s identity as a normative person.  
 
This idea of personhood is morally constituted by, and 
embedded in, a community, social environment, cultural 
beliefs or traditions, which indicate the normative standards, 
value commitments, social obligations, interpersonal 
relationships, and mutual dependencies. It is on the basis of 
these that one is identified and defined as a ‘morally 
beautiful’ person, which makes one a person in a robust 
sense. Thus the essence of the African view of the 
connection between the goodness and beauty of a person is 
that moral goodness is a normative necessary condition for a 
person to be truly and strictly considered beautiful, and to be 
a person in the robust sense. When one is described or 
evaluated as a beautiful person, one can infer that such a 
person has elements of moral goodness, and that one who 
lacks moral goodness cannot be described as a truly 
beautiful person. However, in order to appreciate the 
connection between the aesthetics (beauty) and morality 
(goodness) that are essential to the African conception of 
personhood, we must first, understand their broad view of art 
as social and functional creations, and their view of the 
standards for evaluating art, as contrasted with the modern 
Western views and standards.ii 
 
One essential African standard for determining the beauty of 
art is social-functionality. We may capture this view of art 
with the following quote from Leopold Senghor: “For in 
black African art is not a separate activity, in itself or for 
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itself: it is a social activity, a technique of living, a handicraft 
in fact.”iii It is important to underscore the idea that art is a 
social activity, a way of life, and a technique of living, in 
that art is not simply what one person creates solely to be 
appreciated for its beauty. Art in African cultures is a 
functional activity that has meaning, value, and relevance 
within the social context and norms. This implies that works 
of art are created to serve some practical purposes or goals 
within a particular community. According to Onyewuenyi, 
“The needs of the community determine the artist’s 
production. His art is never ‘art for art’s sake’. He is 
responsible to his society.”iv Art and the process of art 
creation is a form of living which involves various types of 
actions and behavior.  An art that has no relevance is not 
considered art–it is just a ‘thing’, an ‘object’, or ‘junk’.  
 
On this broad view of art, an individual’s action or character 
is his ‘artistic creation’ that is responsible or sensitive to the 
community and its values. This process of ‘character 
creation’ by the individual, which is shaped by the 
community and its values, requires acculturation and 
internalization of communal values. One’s actions in relation 
to one’s character are aimed at achieving communal goals 
and interests, on which individual interests and needs 
depend. As a social activity, art–in terms of both creation 
and appreciation–is guided by social norms and standards. 
Thus, one’s artwork is oriented and geared toward social-
functional appreciation. The need for art and artist to be 
sensitive to the interests and values of the community 
implies that art is ‘depersonalized’ or ‘socialized’. The artist 
cannot just create anything he wants. An artist cannot claim 
that his art is a manifestation or reflection of his own 
feelings and idiosyncratic taste or aesthetic value. A person 
cannot ‘create’ her character based on her personal feelings 
or taste. Aesthetic values and tastes are never individual, 
they are social or communal. Similarly, moral values are 
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communal, hence an individual cannot claim to have acted, 
or seek to justify his action based on his own feelings, value, 
or taste; actions must be sensitive to communal values.  
 
In affirming the social, moral, and functional nature of 
aesthetics and art in African traditions, Onyewuenyi states: 
“One function of the art is making explicit the images by 
which a society recognizes its own values and thus offering a 
means by which the members of a community may express 
and evaluate new elements in their lives.”vAs such, art 
exemplifies a communal world view and a person’s 
character;  it represents a conception of, and expresses a 
feeling about, the social world, life, and reality. People’s 
lives and reality are founded on and shaped by their social-
cultural beliefs and moral values, which their art, lives, and 
actions also manifest. Art may be abstract or realistic. 
Abstract art is inspired by the reality that one experiences, 
one’s beliefs or imaginations about reality, or one’s 
understanding of those experiences, based on the conceptual 
scheme that is shaped by communal life, values, and beliefs. 
Realistic art is a representation or interpretation of how one 
sees or understands reality in the context of communal life, 
values, and beliefs.  
 
One might, prima facie or naively, criticize this African 
normative view of personhood which synthesizes moral 
and aesthetic judgments or features by saying that the 
description or evaluation of a person as beautiful, when in 
fact one implies a moral judgment about the moral 
goodness of a person, is a misunderstanding of a figure-
ative, extended, or an attenuated use of ‘beauty’ which is 
non-aesthetic. For instance, when one says that another 
person is ‘cool’ in contemporary vernacular or slang, it 
does not indicate or describe the temperature of the 
person. Rather, it is used figuratively as a judgment about 
or a description of the person’s looks, attire or dress, 
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demeanor, disposition, or attitude. One may argue that the 
African idea of describing or evaluating a person as 
beautiful in the moral sense of goodness is a figurative 
descriptive use of beauty which does not imply a purely 
normative aesthetic judgment. The notion of ‘cool’ in 
contemporary vernacular or slang is particularly instruct-
ive here in comparison to the Yoruba concept of beauty or 
‘cool’, because ‘cool’ in contemporary slang and among 
the Yorubas, may connote a positive aesthetic judgement 
about one’s physical appearance or demeanor. It may also 
connote a positive moral judgment about one’s acceptable 
behaviors, interaction with others, or moral attitude or 
disposition.  
 
However, this possible naive criticism about how the 
Yorubas and some African cultures may have 
misunderstood the figurative use of beauty is wrong 
because, according to Barry Hallen, the Yorubas 
distinguish between physical and moral beauty.vi Physical 
beauty is for the Yorubas, an ‘outer beauty’ which is 
considered superficial and unimportant. This kind of 
beauty is ephemeral and fleeting. It can change very 
drastically and significantly with situations. For instance, 
a person with an ‘outer’ beautiful face can be permanently 
disfigured in an instance and become physically ugly. The 
more important and fairly permanent kind of beauty is the 
inner moral beauty that reflects a person’s character, 
disposition, values, virtues, and attitudes. These qualities 
are more difficult to cultivate. But once they are 
cultivated, they are less easy to destroy. The most 
important observation and lasting judgment that can be 
made about a person is about his inner beauty or moral 
character. It is one’s character or inner beauty that 
determines what one does; and what one does, is also a 
reflection of one’s inner beauty. This point is summarized 
by Hallen’s maxim “Handsome is as handsome does.”vii  
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One important character trait that the Yorubas consider to be 
an inner beauty is patience. This involves the ability to be 
calm under stress or pressure. This virtue is described by 
Robert Thompson in terms of being ‘cool’. Interestingly, the 
concept of ‘cool’ has an important aesthetic connotation in 
Yoruba culture, which also highlights the logical connection 
between moral goodness and beauty.viii The concept of 
‘coolness’, being calm and patient, is an important moral 
virtue or value that speaks to one’s dignity and strength of 
moral character or inner beauty. Hallen argues that, 
“Good/beautiful moral character tends to be associated with 
persons who generally appear composed, self-controlled, 
patient, and alert.”ix However, one might critically respond 
to this idea by saying that it is unclear how being patient is 
an aesthetic value or something that can be considered 
beautiful. We might begin to unpack this idea by quoting 
Thompson, who says: “Yoruba, in brief, assume that 
someone who embodies command, coolness, and character 
is someone extremely beautiful and like unto a god.”x One 
might say that the physical expression or manifestation of 
patience and calmness is considered beautiful.  
 
However, one’s physical demeanor, appearance, or express-
ion of patience or calmness is a reflection of the inner 
calmness of the person that involves his moral character and 
dignity. Thus, Hallen argues: “A mind distinguished by 
patience, especially in difficult or problematic situations, 
informs a consciousness that maintains self-control and 
optimal communication with itself and its environment.”xi 
The implication is that the Yoruba’s aesthetics regarding the 
outer beauty of the demeanor a person with respect to being 
calm and patient must originate from the inner moral beauty 
of being calm and patient in the mind and in character; it is 
the coolness of the mind and character that allows a person 
to maintain a patient and calm appearance and demeanor. 
Such a person has social functionality because he is better 
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able to contribute positively to the community. It is pertinent 
to note that in a different sense, besides being calm in 
demeanor, a person’s physical beauty does not necessarily 
indicate an inner moral beauty. For instance, if one has a 
physically beautiful face based on facial structure and the 
proportionality of the different parts, it does not necessarily 
mean that one has an inner moral beauty.  
 
When the aesthetic idea or standard of beauty is applied 
solely to physical objects or works of art and craft made by 
humans, it has a different implication and connotation. 
Because objects do not have the rational creativity that will 
engender moral character or virtues, and ‘inner beauty’ that 
can be so evaluated, the aesthetic-moral standard of human 
beauty cannot be applied to objects. It is, therefore, a 
category mistake to apply this human standard of beauty to 
objects or works of art. These objects and art are 
aesthetically evaluated, primarily, for their social sensitivity 
and usefulness, and perhaps, secondarily for their physical 
structural arrangement of their parts. There is something 
instructive about the beauty and goodness of a face based on 
its structure and proportionality–it reflects a kind of harmony 
and order. Based on the African view of ontology, the goal 
and aim of things in reality and of artistic creation are to 
achieve harmony, unity, balance, and order. The ability to 
achieve this goal or seek this aim is considered a standard or 
criterion for goodness and beauty. The idea of harmony is 
coextensive with or logically connected to the idea of social 
functionality. In other words, social functionality is a 
measure of harmony and order, in that a thing or person is 
useful or functional only insofar as it creates or conduces 
harmony and order in the community and reality.  
 
A person or a thing is considered good, and thus, beautiful, if 
directed toward achieving or enhancing harmony and order 
in reality of which the community, people, and things are a 
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part. This idea of considering something as aesthetically 
beautiful and morally good if it is conducive to harmony is 
expressed by the Yoruba’s idea of coolness as both an 
aesthetic and a moral criterion. For the Yorubas, a person is 
physically beautiful because he has a ‘cool’ face, and an 
object such as a carving is beautiful if it is ‘cool’. Aesthetic 
coolness is understood here to connote balance, order, and 
harmony. To buttress this point, Thompson says the Yorubas 
may aesthetically evaluate a carving as follows: “The face of 
the object was rounded and the features were balanced and 
composed.”xii This work of art is deemed beautiful largely 
because there is order, harmony, and balance in the structure 
and different features of the face. The idea of moral coolness 
or goodness also derives from balance or harmony in action, 
behavior, character, and attitudes, and their ability to 
conduce and enhance balance and harmony in a community, 
society and reality. According to Hallen, “It is in this way 
that the aesthetic of the cool underlies and structures the 
morality of the cool, the beautiful, and the good.”xiii 
 
AFRICAN VIEW OF ONTOLOGY AND THE BASIS 
FOR AXIOLOGY 
 
Any art or action that is considered a form of artistic 
creation, can either be both good and beautiful, or bad and 
ugly, because it enhances and conduces balance and 
harmony in nature, reality, and community. An 
understanding of a people’s worldview is necessary for 
understanding their standard of beauty and view of art, 
which are usually inspired by their beliefs about or view of 
reality.  It is pertinent to indicate that Africans have a holistic 
worldview that consists of interconnected religious, 
cosmological, epistemological, and axiological elements and 
dimensions. Uchendu argues that “To know how a people 
view the world around them is to understand how they 
evaluate life, and a people’s evaluation of life, both temporal 
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and non-temporal, provides them with a ‘charter’ of action, a 
guide to behaviour.”xiv The implication of this statement is 
that a people’s view of ontology has implications and 
practical relevance for their axiological or normative 
(aesthetic and moral) views. The way they view reality 
implies how they evaluate or value it, and how they evaluate 
or value reality indicates how they will act or behave within 
or toward it, and what they will create. 
 
The dominant ontological view in many African traditions is 
that reality is a unity that aims toward balance and harmony. 
It is seen as a composite of natural forces and an 
interconnected continuum of natural elements, and it exists 
by virtue of its unity, balance, and harmony. Temples 
indicates that, “The African thought holds that created 
beings preserve a bond one with another, an intimate 
ontological relationship.”xv This ontological relationship 
implies that the connections that people have with one 
another, other creatures, and entities or things, involve 
efforts to maintain unity and harmony in reality. Senghor 
argues that traditional Africans see reality and nature as a 
life force, and for them, “the whole of the universe appears 
as an infinitely small, and at the same time an infinitely 
large, network of life forces which emanate from God and 
end in God, who is the source of life. It is He who vitalizes 
and devitalizes all other beings, all the other life forces.”xvi 
This suggests that God who is the source of life is also the 
source of the design of reality’s unity, which requires 
harmony and balance.  
 
Vernon Dixon argues that the essence of this traditional 
African world view, is markedly different from the modern 
Western view:  
 
In the Euro-American worldview, there is a 
separation between the self and the non-self 
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(phenomenal world). Through this process of 
separation, the phenomenal world becomes 
an Object, an it. By Object, I mean the 
totality of phenomena conceived as 
constituting the non-self, that is, all the 
phenomena that are the antithesis of subject, 
ego, or self-consciousness. The phenomenal 
world becomes an entity considered as totally 
independent of the self. Events or phenomena 
are treated as external to the self rather than 
as affected by one’s feelings or reflections. 
Reality becomes that which is set before the 
mind to be apprehended, whether it be things 
external in space or conceptions formed by 
the mind itself.xvii  
 
Modern Western thoughts see reality in terms of a 
dichotomy between the subjective reality from the 
perspective of humans and the objective reality. The 
objective reality exists independent of a human subject and it 
is logically different from a human conception of it. The 
modern Western view of ontology distinguishes between 
inanimate and animate objects, and thus, finds features by 
which things and reality can be categorized into types. But 
the traditional African worldview sees things as interrelated.  
 
To buttress the African view, Senghor argues that: “As far as 
African ontology is concerned, too, there is no such thing as 
dead matter: every being, every thing–be it only a grain of 
sand–radiates a life force, a sort of wave-particle; and sages 
priests, kings, doctors, and artists all use it to help bring the 
universe to its fulfillment.”xviii I should emphasize the idea 
that people use their view of reality as a basis for their 
actions and artistic creations to bring the universe to 
fulfillment. This fulfillment involves achieving harmony, 
which in essence exemplifies beauty and goodness. This idea 
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is also bolstered by Innocent Onyewuenyi’s description of 
African ontology, i.e., the conception of the nature of 
‘reality’ or ‘being’ as a dynamic force. He argues that: “The 
concept of force or dynamism cancels out the idea of 
separate beings or substances which exist side by side 
independent of one another. ...”xix As a contrast, such an 
independent, atomistic, and separate conception of 
substances in reality, he argues, is what characterizes 
modern Western view of ontology. The implication is that 
such separate and atomic substances lack unity and harmony 
that characterizes African ontology.  
 
Tempels captures this very idea when he argues that the 
African thought system, as instantiated with respect to the 
Bantus, holds that things in reality are forces that help to 
preserve the bond that one has with others, and that reality 
involves some intimate ontological relationships and 
interactions among beings. In his view, “It is because all 
being is force and exists only in that it is force, that the 
category ‘force’ includes of necessity all ‘beings’: God, men 
living and departed, animals, plants, mineral.”xx However, 
forces may differ in their essence: we have divine, celestial 
or terrestrial, human, animal, vegetal, and material or 
mineral forces. These forces exist and interact in harmony. 
The proper interaction among forces for the purpose of 
achieving or enhancing unity and harmony, or the lack, 
thereof, is the basis for explaining phenomena: events, 
occurrences, the creation of works of art, human actions, and 
behavior. Human beings and their creations are a part of this 
composite reality, which is fundamentally, a set of mobile 
life forces. Natural or created objects and the whole of 
reality are interlocking forces in a unity always seeking to 
maintain equilibrium.  
 
When we see reality as a continuum of order, unity, and 
harmony, then human beings are in a sense a beginning, and 
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in another sense, an end. According to Senghor, humans 
constitute “the end of three orders of the mineral, the 
vegetable, and the animals, but the beginning of the human 
order.”xxi On this African ontological view, there is no gap 
or distinction between humans and the phenomenal world of 
‘animate’ and ‘inanimate’ objects, as well as between 
‘animate’ and ‘inanimate’ objects; they are interrelated and 
one is an extension of the other. As such, Africans 
ontologically, conceive of themselves, their community, and 
actions as being in harmony with nature. Such harmony is 
the basis and standard for beauty and goodness. Dixon 
underscores this view as follows: 
 
Their aim is to maintain balance and 
harmony among the various aspects of the 
universe. Disequilibrium may result in 
trouble such as human illness, drought, or 
social disruption. ... According to this 
orientation, magic, voodoo, mysticism are 
not efforts to overcome a separation of man 
and nature, but rather the use of forces in 
nature to restore a more harmonious 
relationship between man and the universe. 
The universe is not static, inanimate or 
‘dead’; it is a dynamic, animate, living and 
powerful universe.xxii 
  
According to African cosmology, anything that happens to 
disrupt balance and harmony in life or reality, such as a 
person's illness, is considered to be bad and ugly. And 
because illness involves disharmony, disruption or lack of 
balance, it is considered to be lacking goodness and beauty.  
 
As such, the treatment of any illness seeks to bring life and 
reality back into balance and harmony, and thus, their 
original beauty and goodness as designed by God. Human 
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actions and creations are understood, and evaluated in terms 
of this view of ontology and cosmology. With respect to this 
mode of understanding, I should note that, the essence of my 
point in articulating the African view of ontology is not to 
examine its soundness with respect to the truth of the 
associated beliefs or statements.  Rather, it is meant, 
primarily, to explore how this view provides a reasonable 
ontological and logical foundation for making sense of the 
African aesthetic and ethical views, and the corresponding 
evaluative practices; that is, whether their aesthetic and 
ethical views are valid. In other words, if we accept their 
beliefs and views of ontology and cosmology, then whether 
we can logically accept (at the least, inductively) or make 
sense of their aesthetic and ethical views and practices. The 
African view of cosmological design suggests that God 
imposed harmony in the arrangement of things in nature, and 
that such harmony is inherently good and beautiful. There 
are reasonable efforts in people’s actions and creations to 
keep nature and reality, of which the community is a part, in 
this harmony.  
 
From this view of ontology and cosmology, Africans 
believe that there is no clear-cut ontological distinction 
between an ‘object’ (say, a work of art or action) and a 
‘subject’ (say, the artist or actor), in the sense that this 
distinction implies that the ‘object’ is to, or may, be 
known, appreciated, evaluated, and comprehended 
objectively and independent of the ‘subject’. This 
distinction is, in part illegitimate, because the ‘object’ and 
‘subject’ are both socially, morally, and ontologically 
embedded in a community, nature, and reality to form a 
harmony in unity. There is no separation among artwork, 
the one who creates it, and the one who appreciates and 
evaluates it for social relevance and functionality, and its 
conduciveness to ontological and cosmological harmony. 
Reality is what is experienced, known, valued, and 
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evaluated by humans, based on their robust social and 
ontological interactions and communion with it. 
Traditional African world view has no use for the idea or 
theory of an objective reality that exists independent of its 
being known by anyone. On this view, values, beliefs, 
people’s actions, artistic creation, and objects make sense 
only when they have practical relevance to people’s 
personal lives that are coextensive with their communal 
social lives. 
 
According to Rosalie Cohen, the African view of ontology 
which blurs the distinction between ‘object’ and ‘subject’, 
implies epistemologically, 
 
a narrowing of perceived conceptual distance 
between the observer and the observed. The 
observed is perceived to be placed so close to 
the individual that it obscures what lies 
beyond it, and so that the observer cannot 
escape responding to it. The individual also 
appears to view the ‘field’ as itself 
responding to him; i.e., although it may be 
completely objective and inanimate to others, 
because it demands response it is accorded a 
kind of life of its own.xxiii 
 
Traditional African views explain and understand 
phenomena by placing them in the context of their 
ontological relations and social context of common sense 
experience, beliefs, and value system. The quest for 
explanation is basically a quest for, or an attempt to, find 
some underlying unity and harmony in an apparent diversity, 
to find simplicity in what appears complex, to find order in 
what appears to be a disorder, and regularity in what appears 
to be irregular or anomalous, in order to bring it within the 
ambit of the standards of goodness and beauty.  
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Western view of ontology usually makes the distinction 
between the natural and supernatural world. This distinction 
makes reality complex and diverse with disharmony and 
conflict between the natural and supernatural world. But the 
African worldview does not make any distinction between 
the natural and supernatural; they are both seen as two 
aspects or dimensions of a unified and harmonious reality. 
According to Mbiti, “the spiritual universe is a unit with the 
physical, and that these two intermingle and dovetail into 
each other so much so that it is not easy, or even necessary, 
at times to draw the distinction or separate them.”xxiv The 
implication of this ontological view is the epistemological 
view that the primary mode of accessing or knowing this 
unified reality is through having various forms of experience 
in and with this world. It is believed that many spiritual or 
supernatural entities and their activities are manifested in 
various forms of physical experiences. Hence, “the diviner 
who diagnoses the intervention of a spiritual agency is also 
expected give some acceptable account of what moved the 
agency in question to intervene. And this account very 
commonly involves reference to some event in the world of 
visible, tangible happenings.”xxv Thus, the epistemological 
African stance, on which their social-functional axiological 
view depends, is fundamentally, experiential and pragmatic, 
in that African people derive knowledge from their robust 
social-functional experience of, and interactions with, a 
unified harmonious reality.  
 
As Senghor indicates: “The African is, of course, sensitive to 
the external world, to the material aspect of being and things. 
... he is sensitive to the tangible qualities of things—shape, 
color, smell, weight, etc. ... .”xxvi The subject is not passive 
with respect to an objectively unknown reality; the subject is 
an active aspect of reality; the subject understands, 
experiences, and knows reality by interacting, communing, 
and shaping it. To know, interact with, and experience 
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reality is to evaluate and value it, which involves imposing 
our moral and aesthetic values on it. An un-evaluated, 
unknown, un-experienced reality—a reality that one cannot 
interact with—is a reality does not exist. Reality is nothing 
or does not exist, if it is not, in some form, experienced, 
interacted with, known or morally and aesthetically 
evaluated; it is only when something is known, experienced, 
interacted with, and evaluated, that it becomes a reality. The 
experienced and evaluated reality is the existent reality that 
is considered substantive and valuable, and it is then given 
due worth and reverence because it comes from God, and as 
such, good and beautiful. The African view of ontology, 
which exemplifies harmony, goodness and beauty, also has 
religious implications and underpinnings. According to 
Mbiti, “to understand their [Africans’] religions we must 
penetrate that ontology.”xxvii 
 
The African view of ontology involves a kind of unitarian 
naturalistic pantheism: the view that everything is a unity 
that is holistically natural, holy, good, and beautiful, and that 
God is in, and the source (designer and creator) of 
everything ‘natural’, as well as their harmony, beauty and 
goodness. We should recollect that the supernatural is part of 
the natural. Mbiti articulates this robust African world view 
of the ontological and cosmological basis for religion, and 
thus, axiology as follows:   “Expressed anthropocentrically, 
God is the Originator and Sustainer of man; the Spirits 
explain the destiny of man; Man is the centre of this 
ontology, the Animals, Plants and natural phenomena and 
objects constitute the environment in which man lives, 
provides a means of existence and, if need be, man 
establishes a mystical relationship with them.”xxviii African 
religious beliefs presuppose the harmony and unity in God’s 
creation as the basis for the sacred and reverent. Reality 
involves a holistic community and a holy communion 
among mutually reinforcing natural life forces consisting of 
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human beings, human communities, spirits, gods, deities, 
stones, sand, mountains, rivers, plants, and animals. 
 
AFRICAN COMMUNALISM, AXIOLOGY, AND VIEW 
PERSONHOOD 
 
The idea of harmony underlying the holistic and unitarian 
view of reality explains the connection between goodness 
and beauty, and it encapsulates the standard for evaluating 
them. Thus, beauty and goodness are either equivalent to or 
imply harmony, and ugliness and badness are either 
equivalent to or imply disharmony. The notions of beauty 
and goodness, which are seen as exemplifying harmony or 
vice versa, are expressed in human behaviors or actions of 
all kinds. These actions are manifested in art creation and 
human interactions with others, which are all geared towards 
creating harmony. This ontological view is the basis for 
saying that if one’s action (including artistic creation) is seen 
as fostering or leading to disharmony in nature, community, 
and reality, then it is considered bad or ugly. And hence 
when such actions are seen as enhancing harmony, they are 
considered beautiful and good. Thus, it makes sense to say 
that one’s action, character, or a person is ugly or beautiful. 
This standard of ‘human beauty’ that involves goodness is 
applied to individual character to provide a moral and 
aesthetic definition or characterization of personhood, such 
that if one is not truly beautiful in this moral aesthetic sense, 
then one is not a person in the true or robust sense.   
 
There are two plausible conceptions of personhood. One is 
the descriptive, physical-metaphysical and the other is the 
normative, moral-social. In many African traditions, the idea 
of a person has both descriptive (physical and metaphysical) 
and normative (social, moral and aesthetic) dimensions.xxix 
A descriptive conception of personhood seeks to analyze the 
features and ontological make-up of an isolated individ-
Essays in Philosophy 17(1) 
 
145 
 
ual.xxx It examines whether a person is immaterial or 
material, or whether a person is made up of one or two 
essential natures. For instance, the metaphysical analysis of 
the nature of the mind and body, and the relationship 
between them involves a descriptive account of personhood. 
This dominant metaphysical view in Western philosophy 
indicates that people must see and identify themselves 
descriptively as isolated atomic individuals who have 
mental, physical, and psychological features of personhood 
outside, independent, and irrespective of the normative and 
cultural structures of their community and their relationships 
with others that define and sustain a community. The 
conception of personhood in African world view is not a 
purely descriptive metaphysical conception of an isolated 
and atomic individual, but primarily, a normative (social, 
moral, and aesthetic) conception.xxxi  
 
However, a normative conception of personhood depends 
on, or assumes that there is a metaphysical, physical and 
descriptive dimension of a person. The moral and aesthetic 
judgment about a person as beautiful, and the subsequent 
social-communal recognition, assumes certain physical 
features and the metaphysical view that a person is not a 
‘determined’ object governed by physical laws over which a 
person has no control. It thus assumes that a person is a 
physical entity that has a mind, is metaphysically free, is 
capable of rational, voluntary, and moral agency, and hence 
can be ascribed obligations, and moral responsibility.xxxii So, 
one cannot be called a person strictly in a robust sense if one 
has not satisfied the normative moral and aesthetic criteria. It 
is common in African traditions to say that ‘one is not a 
person’ or that an individual is simply a ‘thing’ or an animal, 
in that he has not acquired, achieved, or exhibited the 
normative status of a robust person as a truly beautiful 
person. However, one cannot satisfy the normative moral 
and aesthetic criteria of personhood, if one does not have the 
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descriptive metaphysical-physical features. For example, one 
cannot evaluate a chair, as failing to satisfy the normative 
criteria of personhood if such an ‘object’ does not have the 
descriptive metaphysical-physical features of personhood. It 
is in a similar sense that one cannot evaluate an object or art 
work as beautiful in a human sense of having both ‘inner’ 
and ‘outer’ beauty.  
 
Segun Gbadegesin alludes to this very idea by indicating that 
the Yoruba concept of a person “has a normative dimension 
as well as an ordinary meaning.”xxxiii We may understand the 
‘ordinary meaning’ here to indicate the physical, 
psychological, and metaphysical dimensions. However, you 
need these two dimensions to make a robust sense of 
personhood, a beautiful person. Similarly, you need the two 
dimensions of human beauty—inner and outer—for 
someone to be truly beautiful as a combination of goodness 
and beauty. Such a beautiful and robust person is holistic, 
balanced, and in harmony with, or fully socially integrated 
into, the community of values and standards of behavior and 
interactions. It is only then that one can be in harmony in and 
with himself. The African idea of communalism implies that 
the community with, its values, plays a central role in 
helping one to cultivate and then achieve the status of a 
morally beautiful person. Gail Presbey argues that the 
normative (social) conception of personhood is based on an 
intragroup moral and social recognition, and not on the 
descriptive metaphysical features of a person.  
 
According to her, “the Massai (and some other African 
groups’) concepts of ‘personhood’ are not to be understood 
primarily as metaphysical stances on the nature of the self, 
but rather as descriptions of intragroup recognition.”xxxiv 
Such recognition implies that there are normative standards 
of communal evaluation and recognition that indicate a view 
of personhood. One acquires a social, moral, and aesthetic 
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sense of personhood by internalizing and using such 
communal standards as a basis for which, by one’s actions 
and behavior, one constructively and artistically ‘creates’ 
one’s character as a robust person. Thus, people identify 
themselves and are identified by a combination of their 
moral and aesthetic features. For Presbey, “Recognition of a 
person comes at different levels, both when one achieves the 
benchmarks of success (as outlined by the society in a 
conformist sense), and for some, when they excel in an 
individualist way, for example as heroes or healers, in what 
Honneth describes as the transition from ‘person’ to ‘whole 
person’.”xxxv The recognition of an individual is an 
affirmation that her behavior and actions are conducive and 
contributory to communal harmony, and thus harmony in 
nature or reality, as well as in and with himself. 
 
A robust sense personhood, therefore, cannot be the 
extreme individualistic, rational, isolated, autonomous, 
solipsistic, and atomistic being, who is divorced from the 
community, and reasons independently of communal 
values. Rather, personhood involves a rational, emotional, 
and a communally embedded individual who has been 
sufficiently equipped with the attitudes, beliefs, and 
values of his community. These values, which are 
conducive to harmony in the community and reality, 
include caring, sympathy, human welfare, and mutual 
interests. As Gyekye indicates, “The concern for human 
welfare constitutes the hub of the Akan axiological 
wheel.”xxxvi
xxxvii
 By axiology, I understand him to mean a 
value system that includes both morality and aesthetics. 
These values shape one’s conceptual scheme, which gives 
meaning to one’s actions, behavior and artistic creations. 
According to Onwuanibe, “Personhood is a manifestation 
or presence through a body, but never identifiable with 
it.”  This implies that a person is not simply an object 
that can be analyzed in terms of some physical and 
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metaphysical characteristics; he is a subject in whom 
communal values are imparted.xxxviii This idea of 
personhood requires that an individual sees himself and is 
seen beyond his own individuality and the descriptive 
physical-metaphysical features, and in light of the 
communal moral and aesthetic values and the under-
pinning beliefs about reality, in terms of the need to 
maintain harmony.  
 
To buttress this point, Onwuanibe argues that, “the 
transcendence or subjectivity of the human person finds 
expression in the egalitarian spirit.”xxxix This transcendence 
or egalitarian spirit is exemplified in the ability to act in 
ways that are conducive to harmony, based on the value of 
caring and mutual interests, of which one’s interest or well-
being is a part or in harmony with. The goal and 
organization of the community, with respect to harmony, are 
such that the choices and actions (including artistic 
creations) that are beneficial to the community are also 
reciprocally beneficial to the individual. Such choices and 
actions require internalizing communal beliefs and values by 
a process of socialization and acculturation. Such 
internalization engenders one’s ability to make choices and 
act accordingly to achieve harmony. The moral character 
that the communal values help one to create is what makes 
one a person, a moral person—a truly beautiful person. This 
communal idea of personhood involves the idea that the 
harmony of a community, which is an indication of the 
greatness of its culture, is reflected in its ability make 
individuals robust and truly beautiful persons. This involves 
committing the human person and her development or 
aspiration to what the culture stands for—its values and 
beliefs. And the decline in the values of a significant number 
of people—their badness or ugliness—may also indicate the 
ugliness, badness, or a decline in the values or culture of a 
community and vice versa. 
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Julius Nyerere uses the idea of Ujaama (which translates 
into family or brotherhood) to articulate the egalitarian value 
and caring spirit, which is the basis for harmony in African 
communal tradition, and also the basis for the communally 
embedded and integrated self, a truly beautiful person.xl He 
argues that, “In traditional African society we were 
individuals within a community. We took care of the 
community, and the community took care of us.”xli This 
reciprocal idea of caring and human welfare that enhances 
harmony among individuals in community can be couched 
in terms of the fair production and distribution of goods, 
services, and responsibilities in a community. According to 
Nyerere, the harmony underlying “the organization of 
traditional African society—its distribution of the wealth it 
produced–was such that there was hardly any room for 
parasitism.”xlii Because the society was organized on the 
basis of the communal ethos of caring and duty, there was an 
equal and mutual social responsibility for everyone to work 
and contribute to the community and human welfare, and to 
make sure that every person is taken care of. This social-
functionality of humans and their actions created harmony. 
 
This normative idea of personhood implies that people 
aimed to be exemplars or role models that others can look up 
to. By one’s actions, one is creating a character exemplar 
that is modeled for others, especially the young, regarding 
how to behave and what constitutes a truly beautiful person. 
This involves exemplifying communal transcendental 
humanistic, aesthetic and moral values. Hord and Lee 
indicates that the African communal tradition must be seen 
in “the flowering of a humanism that places the community 
rather than the individual at the center...”xliii The connection 
between humanism and communalism, based on the view of 
ontology as a unity and harmony in reality, implies that the 
interests of the community and those of individuals as 
humans cannot be separated in a way that creates a conflict 
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between them. For Lee and Hord, communalism “is the idea 
that the identity of the individual is never separable from the 
sociocultural environment. ... it is constructed in and at least 
partially by a set of shared beliefs, patterns of behaviour, and 
expectations.”xliv  
 
This worldview is further illuminated by Menkiti’s contrast 
between the African and Western idea of personhood. 
 
[W]hereas most Western views of man 
abstract this or that feature of the lone 
individual and then proceed to make it the 
defining or essential characteristic which 
entities aspiring to the description ‘man’ must 
have, the African view of man denies that 
persons can be defined by focusing on this or 
that physical or psychological characteristic 
of the lone individual. Rather, man is defined 
by reference to the environing community. 
As John Mbiti notes, the African view of the 
person can be summed up in this statement: 
“I am because we are, and since we are, 
therefore I am.”xlv 
 
The conclusion that Menkiti draws from this African 
conception of a person is that the needs, reality, and 
existence of the community are coextensive with to those of 
the individual. The needs of the community do not supersede 
or undermine those of individuals, rather the needs and 
interests of individuals derive from, and depend on, those of 
the community, and vice versa, insofar as those interests and 
needs are geared toward human welfare which is conducive 
to harmony. The attitudes, sentiments, motives, intentions, 
and the moral and aesthetic dispositions of an individual are 
formed by virtue of her belonging to, embedded in, 
constituted by, and being in harmony with a community. So, 
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for Menkiti, “the sense of self-identity which the individual 
comes to possess cannot be made sense of except by 
reference to these collective facts.”xlvi  
 
Just as the community helps to define normatively the 
individual as a person rather than as “some isolated static 
quality or rationality, will, or memory,”xlvii
xlviii
 so also is 
personhood–a truly beautiful person–defined by the values 
and beliefs of the community. The idea of personhood in 
African traditions involves a set of axiological qualities that 
is acquired developmentally in the process of participating in 
communal life and acting responsibly to meet the requisite 
acceptable communal expectations or standards that specify 
relevant responsibilities. This worldview implies a view of a 
community that says that we cannot see the community 
simply as the collective aggregation of all the individuals 
who choose voluntarily to belong to the group. In other 
words, the community is not this non-organic random 
collection of atomic and loose individuals.  The African 
worldview sees an individual as a ‘communal organism’. 
According to Menkiti, “We must also conceive of this 
organism as going through a long process of social and ritual 
transformation until it attains the full complement of 
excellences seen as truly definitive of man. And during this 
long process of attainment, the community plays a vital role 
as a catalyst and as prescriber of norms.”xlix Thus, Menkiti 
argues that ‘we' (as a reference to the organically constituted 
community) in African traditions is not simply the 
aggregated sum of people; rather, it is a reference to an 
organic community involving a thoroughly fused ‘we'.  
 
CRITICAL REFLECTION ON AFRICAN IDEA OF 
PERSONHOOD 
 
The idea of community required by this world view and idea 
of personhood, is what Menkiti calls, a constituted view, 
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which he contrasts with the modern Western collectivist 
view.l Such a community is organically constituted as a 
group of persons, principles, relationships, interests, 
processes, and structures, which as a composite, defines 
values, character traits, and moral responsibilities, on the 
basis of which the community is sustained in harmony and 
one is recognized by one’s contribution to such harmony.li 
The individual is integrated into, constituted by, and in, the 
community by the gradual organic processes of 
acculturation, initiation, socialization, education, and ritual 
integration. This communal process of constitution or 
integration, as Wiredu argues, is subtle. According to him, 
“The integration of individuality into community in African 
traditional society is so thoroughgoing that, as is too rarely 
noted, the very concept of a person has a normative layer of 
meaning. A person is not just an individual of human 
parentage, but also one evincing in his or her projects and 
achievements an adequate sense of social responsibility.”lii 
This social responsibility involves mutual concern and 
caring that conduces harmony. As Menkiti indicates, the 
“community ... not surprisingly, is bound by considerations 
of mutual concern... .”liii This mutual concern is the basis for 
the communal responsibility and the spirit of caring.  
 
The idea of communalism involves a set of values and 
relationships that transcend individuals or their simple 
collectivity. So, the communal ‘constitutive’ notion of 
community is not reducible to the individuals because the 
community is not additive; it is not simply the addition of 
the individuals, values, institutions, and structures of the 
community.liv As a member of a constituted community, one 
has the obligation to contribute to it and sustain its harmony. 
Thus, Verhoef and Michel indicate that “an individual is 
obligated to contribute to the community not because it is 
expected of him or her, but because it [the community] is 
him or her.”lv They go on to say that, “the concept of person 
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in the African world view is first and most importantly that 
of community ... this means not that the individual is 
selfless, but that the self is the community.”lvi We may 
recollect that the person and the community are 
ontologically not separate–they are a unity in harmony. 
Personhood is normatively, cosmologically, and 
ontologically tied to and in harmony with the community by 
virtue of being constituted, such that one’s life, creativity, 
actions, and motivation derive from such a connection to 
one’s community. 
 
The different African accounts of personhood and 
community have been criticized for overemphasizing the 
community to the detriment of the individual. Although 
Menkiti argues that the African idea of personhood ought to 
be understood primarily as a normative, and not a 
metaphysical-descriptive stance, it appears he is not always 
not clear about the precise nature of personhood: whether it 
is ontological or normative, and the relationship between the 
two.
lviii
lvii This lack of clarity has engendered a criticism of his 
view by Kwame Gyekye. Menkiti sometimes suggests that 
the normative sense of personhood is an indication of an 
ontological status. This ‘ontological’ manner of speaking 
may have (mis)led people like Gyekye to believe that 
Menkiti is providing a metaphysical account.  It is 
pertinent to recollect that African axiological views are 
dependent on and can only be properly understood based on 
their view of ontology or reality as a unity and harmony. 
When people say in African traditions that ‘an individual is 
not a person’ or that a person is not good or beautiful, it is 
meant to be a normative judgment that one has not behaved 
morally or act properly based on accepted values and the 
goal of achieving harmony in reality. Such utterance is 
neither meant to, nor does it deny, that the person lacks the 
relevant ontological status or descriptive metaphysical or 
psychological features of personhood. However, it does have 
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an ontological implication, which is that he is out of balance 
and harmony in and with himself and others, his community, 
nature, and reality. This ontological view regarding 
disharmony is a basis for the moral and aesthetic judgment 
that he lacks goodness and beauty. 
 
In criticizing Menkiti, Gyekye argues that the idea of a 
person acquiring full personhood or becoming more of a 
person metaphysically is bizarre and incoherent. Such view, 
cannot but be riddled with confusions, unclarities, and 
incoherencies.lix But if we appreciate that the idea of 
personhood in African traditions is a normative idea, and 
that one achieves or attains the normative standard or feature 
progressively and developmentally, then we can appreciate 
and make sense of the idea of acquiring full personhood as a 
moral and beautiful person, and why an individual cannot 
have a meaningful sense of personhood outside of the 
communal normative structures that shape and define a 
person.lx Gyekye insists that social commitments, 
relationships, and moral responsibilities, are not essential 
features of a person and they cannot be said to be defining 
features of personhood. According to him, “The individual is 
by nature a social (communal) being, yes; but she is, also by 
nature, other things as well; that is, she possesses other 
attributes that may also be said to constitute her nature.”lxi 
This suggests that being social or moral is similar to other 
accidental features of a person, which are not intrinsic or 
essential to one’s personhood, and as such, they do not 
define a person’s essence.  
 
Based on the view that the essential features of personhood 
must be viewed metaphysically and not socially, 
aesthetically or morally, Gyekye argues:  
 
A human person is a person whatever his age 
or social status. Personhood may reach its full 
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realization in community, but it is not 
acquired or yet to be achieved as one goes 
along in society. What a person acquires are 
status, habits, and personality or character 
traits; he, qua person, thus becomes the 
subject of the acquisition, and being thus 
prior to the acquisition process, he cannot be 
defined by what he acquires. One is a person 
because of what he is, not because of what he 
has acquired.lxii 
 
For Gyekye, a person is an entity in which the necessary 
metaphysical features inhere, and this entity is logically prior 
to and independent of a community. This represents a very 
narrow metaphysical view of personhood with a lacuna that 
the more robust Africa normative axiological (moral and 
aesthetic) view seeks to fill. This African view insists that 
one must contextualize the abstract metaphysical view of 
personhood by making it relational to one’s community. So, 
Gyekye’s critique suggests that he assumes that the African 
view of personhood is a metaphysical view. To the extent 
that the African view is not, primarily, a metaphysical view, 
but has merely used it as the foundation on which its 
normative moral and aesthetic view depends, Gyekye may 
be said to be attacking a strawman.   
 
However, Gyekye does accept that if the African account of 
personhood is understood as a moral thesis, then it is 
interesting and relevant for understanding the communal 
structures and value systems in African societies. Thus, he 
says: “With all these said, however, this aspect of his 
[Menkiti] account adumbrates a moral conception of 
personhood and is, on that score, interesting and relevant to 
the notion of personhood important for the communitarian 
framework.”lxiii In Gyekye’s view, this moral account of 
personhood is fundamentally correct because: 
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The judgment that a human being is ‘not a 
person’, made on the basis of that 
individual’s consistently morally 
reprehensible conduct implies that the pursuit 
or practice of moral virtue is intrinsic to the 
conception of a person held in African 
thought. The position here is, thus, that: for 
any p, if p is a person, then p ought display in 
his conduct the norms and ideals of 
personhood. For this reason, when a human 
being fails to conform his behavior to the 
acceptable moral principles or to exhibit the 
expected moral virtues in his conduct, he is 
said to be ‘not a person’. The evaluative 
statement opposite this is, ‘he is a person’ 
means, ‘he has good character’, he is 
peaceful–not troublesome’, ‘he is kind’, ‘he 
has respect for others’, ‘he is humble’. The 
statement ‘he is a person’, then, is a clearly 
moral statement. It is a profound appreciation 
of the high standards of the morality of an 
individual’s conduct that would draw the 
judgment ‘he is truly a person’.lxiv  
 
Gyekye accepts that in African traditions, one’s behaviors, 
character, and actions must conform to and be in harmony 
with acceptable moral and social principles, and that the 
ability to act in ways that are conducive to harmony in a 
community and with others is the basis for determining 
whether or not one has acquired personhood–and thus, truly 
beautiful.  
 
His point in the above quote is that being called a person 
implies that ‘one has good character’, one is peaceful–not 
troublesome’, ‘one is kind’, ‘one is respectful of and to 
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others’, or that ‘one is humble’, As discussed earlier, these 
qualities are those that characterize the ideas of harmony and 
balance, and the Yoruba ideas of ‘inner and outer beauty’ 
and ‘coolness’. These qualities are manifested in positive 
outer demeanor and appearance that represent outer and 
physical beauty and moral goodness. In spite of his 
admission of the merits of this African view of personhood, 
Gyekye argues that the emphasis on communal values and 
the need for individuals to attain the moral and aesthetic 
values of goodness and beauty based communal values and 
standards implies a radical form of communitarianism, 
which seeks to reduce “a person to intellectual or rational 
inactivity, servility, and docility.”lxv On this radical view, a 
person is “held as a cramped or shackled self, responding 
robotically to the ways and demands of the communal 
structure.”lxvi This idea of personhood vitiates or diminishes 
individuals’ talents, creativity, initiatives, and ingenuity. As 
such, it may prevent individual from truly achieving, 
creatively, moral and aesthetic excellence.  
 
In Gyekye’s view, individual excellence which derives from 
his own creativity cannot be seen as a derivative from the 
idea of communal excellence, because communal excellence 
constrains individual creativity, ingenuity, and excellence. 
He argues that a reasonable community must recognize the 
claims and demands of the community (in terms of social 
obligations) and the freedom and creativity of the individual. 
So, what we should expect to find in any society is some 
various degrees of balance between individualism and 
communalism, in that some societies may have more or less 
individualism than communalism, and vice versa. Every 
society must find a proper balance between the communal 
interests and individual freedom and creativity and the 
relative importance of each in a given situation.lxvii It is clear 
that an individual and her interests are dependent on, 
coextensive with, and cannot be detached from the 
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community and its interest. To couch communalism in terms 
of what is beneficial to the community does not imply that 
the community’s interest and welfare are antithetical to the 
individual’s interests, welfare, creativity, and rational life 
plan. Such conflict exists only when we do not see reality, 
individuals, and community as a unity in harmony but as 
separate and in conflict. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The balance and harmony that Gyekye wants between the 
needs of the community and those of individual are precisely 
what the African view seeks to capture by its view of 
community and the normative conception of a person as 
good and beautiful. This idea of balance or harmony, which 
is exemplified in the conception of moral and aesthetic value 
systems and standards, is based on the view of harmony in 
ontology, and the need to maintain an ontological balance. 
So, one is a person in a robust sense, a truly beautiful person, 
only if one is a moral person. And one is a moral person only 
if one has harmony and balance or ‘coolness’ in one’s 
character, and one is able to act in ways that are conducive to 
being in harmony with others, one’s community, and reality. 
To have harmony in one’s character will also involves 
creating works of art, including one’s character and actions 
that are in harmony with reality and with the community, or 
sensitive to its values by being socially functional. This 
implies that the aesthetic value or standard of beauty for 
humans is logically connected to the moral value or standard 
of goodness, both of which depend on the idea of harmony 
in reality, the world, nature, and community, of which the 
individual human person, his actions, and harmony are an 
integral part. 
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